What will the UK's critical infrastructure look like in 2030? In 2050? How resilient will it be? Decisions taken now by policy makers, NGOs, industrialists, and user communities will influence the answers to these questions. How can this decision making be best informed by considerations of infrastructural resilience? This project will consider future developments in the UK's energy and transport infrastructure and the resilience of these systems to natural and malicious threats and hazards, delivering a) fresh perspectives on how the inter-relations amongst our critical infrastructure sectors impact on current and future UK resilience, b) a state-of-the-art integrated social science/engineering methodology that can be generalised to address different sectors and scenarios, and c) an interactive demonstrator simulation that operationalises the otherwise nebulous concept of resilience for a wide range of decision makers and stakeholders.Current reports from the Institute for Public Policy Research, the Institution of Civil Engineers, the Council for Science and Technology, and the Cabinet Office are united in their assessment that achieving and sustaining resilience is the key challenge facing the UK's critical infrastructure. They are also unanimous in their assessment of the main issues. First, there is agreement on the main threats to national infrastructure: i) climate change; ii) terrorist attacks; iii) systemic failure. Second, the complex, disparate and interconnected nature of the UK's infrastructure systems is highlighted as a key concern by all. Our critical infrastructure is highly fragmented both in terms of its governance and in terms of the number of agencies charged with achieving and maintaining resilience, which range from national government to local services and even community groups such as local resilience forums. Moreover, the cross-sector interactions amongst different technological systems within the national critical infrastructure are not well understood, with key inter-dependencies potentially overlooked. Initiatives such as the Cabinet Office's new Natural Hazards Team are working to address this. The establishment of such bodies with responsibility for oversight and improving joined up resilience is a key recommendation in all four reports. However, such bodies currently lack two critical resources: (1) a full understanding of the resilience implications of our current and future infrastructural organisation; and (2) vehicles for effectively conveying this understanding to the full range of relevant stakeholders for whom the term resilience is currently difficult to understand in anything other than an abstract sense. The Resilient Futures project will engage directly with this context by working with relevant stakeholders from many sectors and governance levels to achieve a step change in both (1) and (2). To achieve this, we will focus on future rather than present UK infrastructure. This is for a two reasons. First, we intend to engender a paradigm shift in resilience thinking - from a fragmented short-termism that encourages agencies to focus on protecting their own current assets from presently perceived threats to a longer-term inter-dependent perspective recognising that the nature of both disruptive events and the systems that are disrupted is constantly evolving and that our efforts towards achieving resilience now must not compromise our future resilience. Second, focussing on a 2030/2050 time-frame lifts discussion out of the politically charged here and now to a context in which there is more room for discussion, learning and organisational change. A focus on *current resilience* must overcome a natural tendency for the agencies involved to defend their current processes and practices, explain their past record of disruption management, etc., before the conversation can move to engaging with potential for improvement, learning and change.

Recent major events have exposed the susceptibility of the UK's emergency response capability. For example, after the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005, the UK government acknowledged that weaknesses existed in its preparation and response on the day. It is reported that in terms of the response, the geographical proximity of the explosions led to uncertainty over roles and responsibilities. Consequently, the UK government has indicated that improvements must be made in developing the plans, capabilities and structures to be put in place to respond to future major emergencies, whatever the cause. Similarly, in the USA, the events of 11 September 2001 have provided the drive for broad changes in emergency response procedures and technologies aimed at improving readiness for high consequence events.Pre-planned fixed response solutions for major emergencies are totally inappropriate for rapidly evolving large-scale unprecedented events (REScUE). It is inconceivable to pre-plan responses for all possible major manmade and natural events. The proposed research will provide multi-agency co-ordinated emergency response solutions for any situation. Significantly, a feature of our research is the intimate involvement of practitioners from government resilience teams, emergency planning units and the emergency services to assure validity, acceptance and relevance of our solutions. As well as theoretical results, we shall deliver a highly visual computational tool by which we can simulate a co-ordinated emergency response for evaluation in command and control centres.The intended research offers a novel solution to coping with fast changing, major events through the co-ordination of the collective efforts and actions of the multiple agencies (emergency planning units, ambulance service, fire brigade, police force) involved in emergency response. This research will investigate and develop decision making methods to construct in real time a near-optimal response team consisting of units composed of individuals from different emergency organisations together with equipment and vehicles. Further, these methods will specify coherent response operations for these units. Given the critical time constraints in an emergency situation, the decision making methods will determine within minutes, how a team should be formed, how individuals should be formed into team units, how roles and responsibilities are allocated within these units, and how tasks should be assigned to personnel thus defining the response operations of these units.To explore the effectiveness of alternative response teams, and their co-ordinated response to REScUE, the research will devise a computational agent-based simulation environment. This environment will model a major event as it rapidly unfolds during which the operations of some units within the response team may become sub-optimal in terms of them no longer being appropriate in time, and thus the overall co-ordinated emergency response being degraded. As the situation develops, it would be disruptive to the overall response, and time-consuming, to redefine repeatedly an entirely new response team and the detailed operations of its units. Thus within the existing response team, units exhibiting a sub-optimal response will be identified and the necessary adjustments will be made to their composition and operations.