The focus of this proposal is on the detection and survival of wrong code compiler defects, which we argue present a cyber-security threat that has been largely ignored to date. First, incorrectly compiled code can introduce exploitable vulnerabilities that are not visible at the source code level, and thus cannot be detected by source-level static analysers. Second, incorrectly compiled code can undermine the reliability of the application, which can have dramatic repercussions in the context of safety-critical systems. Third, wrong code compiler defects can also be the target of some of the most insidious security attacks. A crafty attacker posing as an open source developer can introduce a compiler-bug-based backdoor into a security-critical application by adding a patch that looks perfectly innocent but which, when compiled with a certain compiler, yields binary code that allows the attacker to compromise the software. In this project, we aim to explore automated techniques that can detect and prevent such problems. In particular, we plan to investigate techniques for automatically finding compiler-induced vulnerabilities in real software, approaches for understanding the extent to which an attacker could maliciously modify an application to create a compiler-induced vulnerability, and methods for preventing against such vulnerabilities at runtime.